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Abstract. This paperanalyzessomeeconomicissuesinvolvedwith the common
practiceof usingmeteredwaterrate revenueto funddebtretirementassociated
with
theprovisionof municipalwater and wastewaterservices.We concludethat rather

thansimplyraisingthemetered
rate,cityofficials
should
seriously
consider
increasing
thetax rateleviedunderthelocalpropertytax. Thereis animportant
trade-offin the
choice
of a pricepolicy.An increased
property
taxratecanresultin tax savings
to
somehomeowners,whichlowerstheirnet expenditure
for water.However,a
corresponding
decrease
in themeteredratemayincrease
waterconsumption,
whichin
turnraisesoperatingcost.In orderto do whatis bestfor homeowners,it mightmake
sense
to give othercustomers
(e.g., a university)an easyride,evenif the latter,
because
of its low (inelastic)priceelasticityof demandfor water,is viewedby the
municipalityas a cash cow.
1.

Introduction

In November 1992, residents of Houghton, Michigan,
receivedthe following letter from their city government:
Dear Water/Sewer

water used during a billing period once usage exceeds a
given amount [e.g., Younget al., 1983; Lyman, 1992].
In contrast, a flat rate, or lump sum charge, results in a
zero price for incremental water use. The frequently cited
studyby Hanke[ 1970]found that substitutinga metered rate
for a flat rate caused the volume

Customer:

of water

consumed

to

decline. Subsequentstudieshave also found that the quantity of water demanded declined as its price rose [e.g.,
Hogarty and MacKay, 1975; Danielson, 1979; Carver and

As you are aware, the Portage Lake Water and Sewage
Authority is currently constructinga new 20 million dollar
sewagetreatment plant.... We have been recently notified by
theAuthoritythat commencingnext year, our monthlysewage
treatment charge will increase from its current $24,000 per
monthto approximately$80,000per month.This increaseis for
Bond Debt Retirement only and does not include any other
maintenanceor operational costs.
Therefore, effective December 1992 your monthly water/
sewagerate will increaseby fifty percent. Once the impact of
this increase is measured on Fund Revenues, a further rate
adjustmentin the magnitudeof approximately10to 15%will be
forthcomingin June of 1993.

Boland, 1980; Howe, 1982; Hanke and de Mare,
Young et al., 1983; Lyman, 1992].

1982;

The purpose of this paper is to analyze some economic
issuesinvolved with the policy of raising the metered water
rate to obtain additional revenue to fund debt retirement.

In

particular, we addressthe following question: Rather than
raisingthe meteredrate, shoulda city chooseto raise the tax
rate levied under its local property tax? In addressingthis
question,two points are stressed.First, an increase in the
Prior to December 1992, customerswere chargeduniform meteredrate raises revenue and decreasesconsumptionand
monthlymetered rates of $0.75 per hundredcubic feet and hence the variable (operating) cost associated with the
$1.79per hundred cubic feet for water and wastewater provisionof water. Second,raisingproperty taxes to fund

(sewage),
respectively.After December1992thewastewater debt retirement allows home owners who utilize tax deducrate rose to $3.06 per hundredcubic feet. Thus while the tions or credits to shift some of the burden to other taxpaycombinedwater-wastewater rate rose 50%, the increase in
the wastewater rate was 71%.

ers. The accountingstanceadoptedhere is purely local, and
the tax shift to other areas is therefore ignored. As we will
demonstrate, the optimum mix of metered revenue and

The new wastewatertreatmentplant is also used by the
city of Hancock. Cost sharingof the debt betweenthe two propertytax revenuedependson variousparametersfaced
citiesis basedon historicalusageof water.Like Houghton, by decision makers.
Hancock has announced a metered rate increase to cover its
share of debt retirement.

A meteredrate is a userfee resultingin a positivepricefor

2.

Tax Setting

Unlike paymentsarisingfrom a combinedmeteredwaterincremental water use. A metered rate allows for a number
wastewater
rate, property taxes are deductible under the
of possibleprice structures,suchas uniformrates,which

mayvaryfrom peakto off-peakperiods;blockrates,which federal income tax. In effect, this tax preference subsidizes
resultin a rate changefor water usedbeyonda certain the consumptionof localpublicservicesfor individualswho
amount;
andsteprates,whichresultin a different
rateonall itemize on their federal income tax form.
Generally, if r is the proportional tax rate applied to

Copyright
1994by theAmerican
Geophysical
Union.

residentialreal estate with an assessedvalue (the tax base) of
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V, propertytaxes paid, T, equal rV. Let t representthe
percentageof a $1 increasein T offset by the federal
2807
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deductionfor itemizingfederal taxpayers.Thus the deduc- marginalpropertytax increases
(c = 1). In this case,they
tion of T lowers the effective "price" of local government couldshiftthe entiredebtburdento the stategovernment
by
servicesfrom T to (1 - t)T. Since we focuson the provision settingthe metered rate equal to 0 and financing both debt
of water and wastewater services, henceforth we assume and variable cost out of property taxes. All water customers
that property taxes, T, are earmarked for the water- would be free riders.
As demonstrated in the next section, city officials should

wastewater utility.
In addition, many states, including Michigan, have a

recognize an important trade-off when choosing a price
"circuit breaker" that provides a refund of state income policy. Raising the property tax rate does result in tax
taxes if residentialproperty tax paymentsexceeda specified savings to some home owners, which lowers their net
percentage of the taxpayer's income. A circuit breaker expenditureon the public service. However, a correspondworks like a tax deductionexcept that the net cost of a $1 ing decreasein the meteredrate is likely to increasewater
increase in T is reduced by the credit rate c rather than the consumption,which in turn raises variable cost.
taxpayer's federal marginal income tax rate t. In other
words, c representsthe percentageof property tax offsetby
the property tax credit against the state's income tax.
However, if the decrease in state income tax of c reduces the
federal deduction by c, federal taxes would increase by ct,
resulting in the taxpayer's losing the federal deduction. In
this case, the net cost to the circuit-breaker-qualifying
household of increasing T by $1 is 1 - tc + ct =
(1 - t)(1 - c). Therefore the appropriate method of
financing the debt on the new wastewater treatment plant is
of interest to those taxpayers who itemize and also to those
for whom c is nonzero.

For Michigantaxpayers,c takes on valuesof 0%, 40%, or
100% (seeFisher [1993]for additional discussionon property
tax credits). In 1990, 38% of Michigan residentsfiling federal
income tax form 1040 claimed a property tax credit [Michigan Department of Treasury, 1992].
The circuit breaker and the deductibility of local property
taxes result in a loss of revenue to federal and state treasur-

ies. This lost revenue, commonly called a "tax expenditure"
[Hyman, 1993, p. 501], represents an intergovernmental
subsidy to residents of local communities which have a
relatively heavy reliance on property taxes. Any such subsidy is likely to be offset by higher federal or state tax rates
to compensatefor the lost tax revenue. Thus the substitution
of local property taxes for metered water rates has equity
implications. It is likely to adversely affect individuals who
do not itemize or use the circuit breaker and therefore might
result in transfers from low-income individuals to highincome individuals. Such distributional considerations,
while beyond the scope of this paper, raise questionsas to
the appropriatenessof tax preferences as a means for
providing subsidies.
Houghton city officials were asked why the city did not
raise property taxes to meet the debt paymentsassociated
with the new wastewater treatment plant. Their immediate
responsewas: "If we did that we would be givinga free ride
to the largest single user of water in the city." This user is
Michigan TechnologicalUniversity (MTU), which utilizes
approximately 50% of the water distributed (see Table 1).
The city of Houghtonsendsout approximately1400monthly
water bills in addition to MTU's, of which approximately
1200are to residentialcustomers.Excluding MTU' s approximately 7000 students, Houghton's population is approximately 7500 (1990 census).
Is it always in the interest of home owners to initiate a
price policy which prevents a university or other large,
tax-exempt users from taking a free or "easy" ride with
respect to locally provided public services? An extreme
example shows why the answer to this question is no.
Supposethat all home owners of a community pay 0% of

3.

Modeling
Supposea city comprisestwo types of home owners:

those for whom c or t (or both) > 0 and home owners for
whom c = t = 0. We assume that the city government
choosesthe metered rate and property tax level so as to
minimize total expenditure (EXPEND) on municipal waterwastewaterservicesby both sets of home owners, subjectto
the constraint that the water-wastewater utility budget be
balanced. City officials are viewed simply as agents elected

by home owners(principals),and they serve the interestsof
home owners. We abstract from any analysis of the principal-agentproblemthe casein which agentspursue personal
goals that conflict with principals' interests [Pindyck and
Rubinfeld, 1992, p. 625].
While a municipality may face an upper limit on its
property tax rate, we assume that this constraint is not

binding and nothing restricts decision makers from using
propertytax revenueto fund debt retirement payments.For
example,conditionalgrantsfrom the federal or state governmentmightbe usedto partiallyfinancethe constructionof a
new wastewater treatment plant. The donor might specify
that user-basedchargesbe levied to retire any debt associated with the construction. Such a mandate, however, need
not imply that metered rates can serve as the only price
instrument. One might reasonably argue that if property
values and water usageare positively related, a property tax

representsa user fee (the property tax as a user fee is
discussedby Rosen [1992, p. 385]). In any event, our
analysis demonstrates that preventing the use of property

taxesas a price instrumentmightnot be in the interestof
local home owners.

Our objectivefunctionaccordswell with the evidencethat
home ownersare most likely to constitutethe majority of
voters in local elections [Jackson, 1974; Piele and Hall,
1973].For non-residential
propertyownersand residential
landlords,water bills and property taxes are deductible

Table 1. University'sShareof City of Houghton'sTotal
Water Consumption, 1988-1992
Year

University' s
Share, %

1988
1989
1990
199!
1992

48.2
46.4
47.2
46.6
47.4

Source: City of Houghton.
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businessexpenses.Alternatively, one might assumethat

Lr=
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1-a[t+c(1-t)]+r_>0

(4)

choices
shouldbeviewedasoptimum
fromthestandpoint
of
themedianvoter,whois likelyto be a tax itemizer[Rosen, L •, = Q•(1 + ©H) + ,[Q•(1 + O,u)
1992,p. 596]. Even in this case,it makessenseto view the
+ Qu( 1 + ©u) - 13(dQ/dP]>-0
government
asattempting
to minimize
thetaxburdenof its
spending
policiesto home owners[Eppleand Schipper,
L•, = dRu/dP + r[dR•j/dP + dRu/dP
1981].
Since we assume an exogenous property tax base V,

choosing
thepropertytax rater is equivalentto choosing
the
property
tax levelT. Thuscityofficials
chooseT andP soas
to

minEXPEND = [PQu(P) + T(1 - t)(1 - c)]a

+ [PQu(P) + T](1 - a)

(1)

subjectto

PQ(P) + T- 13Q(P)- D = 0

(2)

where

P price per unit of water (uniform metered rate);
Q(P) total quantity of water consumedas a functionof P
=QH(P) + Qc•(P) (H, household;U, university);
T
r
V
/3

total property taxes (- r¾);
proportional property tax rate (0 -< r < 1);
residential property tax base;
constantmarginal cost (MC) of providinga unit of
water (/3 > 0);
D debt retirement payment;
a proportion of home ownerswho itemize or use
circuit breaker (0 <- a -< 1);
t marginal federal income tax rate (0 -< t < 1);
c circuit breaker rate (0 -< c -< 1).

- d(TVC)/dP] -> 0

(5)
(6)

L,= PQ(P) + T- !3Q(P) - D = O
TLr = 0

(7)

PL i, = 0

(8)

where ©• = (dQH/dP)(P/Qu) and ©cr = (dQu/dP)(P/
Qv) are the householdand university price elasticity of
demandfor water, respectively(19u and 19r• -< 0).
We assumea production processwith constant marginal
cost[MC = d(TVC)/dQ = /3]. Thus averagevariable cost,
13Q/Q, equals/3. Hereinafter, total variable cost,/3Q, and
averagetotal cost, (13Q + D)/Q, will be denoted by TVC
and ATC, respectively.Notice that for all Q > 0, ATC >/3.
Letting R• = PQi for i = [H, U], the term Qi(1 + Oi) in
(5) is simplydRi/dP. Finally, d(TVC)/dP = 13(dQ/dP)<- O.
The above model represents the short run. The debt
retirement payment, D, representsa fixed cost associated
with an existing plant. We assume that any increase in
wastewatercausedby a changein price policy can be treated
throughthe designcapacity of the existing plant.
If the optimumvalue for the property tax level, T*, is >0,
then (4) and (7) imply

r=a[t+c(1-t)]-

1

(9)

In treating a as exogenous,we ignore two possiblecases where the bracketed term, representingtax savingsto home
that an increase in r can cause: (1) taxpayers who were ownerson each additional dollar of property taxes, is < 1, as
c_<l.
previouslyineligiblefor the credit or previouslynot federal
In order to interpret conditions (4)-(8) as well as to
tax itemizersbecomeeligibleor itemize with the new higher
propertytax rate and (2) taxpayersreach the maximum illustratea possibletrade-off between tax savingsand variable cost, four cases are discussed.
allowablecredit(in Michiganthe maximumcreditis $1200).
Case1. SupposedQ/dP < 0 and no home owner itemNote that in equations(1) and(2), T is not an argumentof
izesor takesthe propertytax credit (a = 0). With a = 0, (9)
thefunctionQ•( ) andhenceQ( ). The sensitivity
of Q•
results in r = -1. Substituting this result into (5) yields

to changesin property taxes might be near or equal to 0
whenT is restrictedto coveringdebtretirement,D. In this -Qv(1 + O•) + 13(dQ/dP)>- O, whichcan be satisfiedby
case,homeownersmightrecognizethat changingQJuwill an equality if (an unlikely event) the price elasticityof
not affect their property taxes (D is a fixed obligation demandfor the universityis elastic(© cr< - 1). P wouldbe
increaseduntil d(TVC)/dP = dRv/dP. The reductionin
independent
of Qu)- However,whenotherfactorsareheld
total variable cost, the marginalbenefit to home owners of
constant,an increasein T reduceshouseholddisposable
raisingP, is equatedto the city's declinein revenuefrom the
income,
whichmaycausethe demand
for waterto drop.On
university,the marginalcostto home ownersof raisingP.
theotherhand, if variablecostis coveredby propertytaxes,
For inelastic(O• > - 1) or unitary (Ocr = - 1) price
onemightdiscoverQu to be sensitive
to T owingto bothan
elasticity, with T > 0, (5) fails to satisfy the necessary
incomeandsubstitution
effect[HogartyandMacKay, !975],
condition for a constrainedminimum. Thus, T* is set equal
assuming
that homeownersareinformedasto whatportion
to 0 and the balanced budget constraint (equation (6))

of variablecostis beingcoveredby propertytaxes.In this
requiresthat the optimummeteredprice, P*, satisfy(P analysis,
we simplifymattersby assuming
thatchanges
in T
13)/P= D/(PQ). In otherwords,P* = ATC >/3.
haveno effecton Q•.
Case2. SupposeQ r• = 19• = 0 and0 < a <- 1. With no
The Lagrangianis
university,Qn = Q. Substituting(9) into (5) yieldsthe
L = EXPEND + •'[PQ(P) + T- 13Q(P)- D] (3) condition 1 > 0, implying that P* = 0. T is the only
instrument used to finance total variable cost and debt

wherer is the Lagrange
multiplier.
LettingL i denotethe
partialderivativeof L with respectto variablei, the KuhnTuckerminimumconditionsare [Chiang,1984,p. 722]

retirement.

Thiscaseservesto highlightthe trade-off(or lack thereof)
mentionedabove. Since household(total) consumptionof
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Short-Runand Long-Run Implicationsof the PropertyTax Instrument
Long Run (D = 0)

Short Run (D > 0)
1.

T=O

2.

P > MC

T>0

3.

P > MC, T < D (outcome1)

T=0

P -- MC

4.

T>0

0<P<MC

P = MC, T = D (outcome 2)
0 < P < MC, T > D (outcome 3)

From case4, interiorsolutionsfor T andP are consistent
withparametervalues:0 < a -< !, ©H > -1, and O u > -1.

mentioned above. Since household (total) consumptionof
water is perfectly price inelastic, OH -- O, reducingP to 0
doesnot causean increasein total variable cost,/3QH. P* is
set equal to 0 to capture the full tax advantagesassociated
with property tax financing. This result holds regardlessof
the value for a. With d(T¾C)/dP -- O, home owners for
whom t -

c -

0 are indifferent

to the value of P.

Case 3. SupposeQ v = 0, OH < 0, and 0 < a < 1.
Substituting(9) into (5) yields

a[t + c(1 - t)][dRH/dP] >- -{1 - a[t + c(1 - t)]}
ß[d(TVC)/dP]. (10)
Since d(TVC)/dP < 0, satisfying (10) by an equality re-

quires that dRH/dP > 0, which is the case when the
householdprice elasticityis inelastic (© H > --1). Inelastic
demandis consistentwith empiricalestimatesof On [e.g.,
Danielson, 1979; Carver and Boland, 1980; Young et al.,
1983; Lyman, 1992]. Satisfying (10) by an equality means

recently announcedrate increase; decreasingconsumption
would only result in a higher metered rate." Therefore it

appearsthat MTU is not preparedto initiate any conservation policies.This suggeststhat the university'sprice elasticity of demand,© t•, mightbe near0 overthe relevantprice
range.Thus (11) mightbe satisfiedby an equality, in which
case minimizing EXPEND requires that both T and P be
greaterthan0 andthe optimummeteredrate be lessthanthe
averagetotal cost. The university would be an easy rider,
sinceit would pay a smaller portion of the debt retirement
than its portion of total water consumption.An important
messageis that no matter how liquid the cash cow is, city
officialsshouldnot ignore the tax advantagesavailable to
home ownersthrough revenue mechanismsother than metered rates.

4.

Short- and Long-Run Implications

that P* is also >0.

Supposecity officials ignore tax preferencesassociated
with propertytax financing(T = 0). In the shortrun, witha

Recall that the term [t + c(1 - t)] represents the tax
savingsto home owners on each dollar raised through the
property tax. Thus the left-hand side of (10), air + c(1 -

balancedbudget, the metered rate (P) equals the average
total cost (ATC) but exceedsmarginal cost (MC). However,
in the long run (D = 0), P = MC, resultingin an efficient

t)][dRH/dP], is the marginalcost to home ownersof in-

level of waterconsumption.
Theseresultsare summarized
in

creasingP; it representsthe lost tax savingsresultingfrom
not raising an additional dollar of revenue through the
propertytax. As one would expect, as a, t, or c rises, the
marginalcostto home ownersof increasingP alsorises.The
fight-handside of (10),-{1 - a[t + c(1 - t)]}[d(TVC)/
dP], is the marginalbenefit to home owners of increasingP;
it representsthe reductionin total variablecostwhich could
havebeen coveredfrom property taxes. Clearly, minimizing
EXPEND requires that the trade-off between tax savings

columns 1 and 3 of Table 2.

With T > 0, in the short run, the balanced budget
constraintrequires that T be either less than, equal to, or
greaterthanD. In column2 of Table 2, thesethree outcomes
are labeled 1, 2, and 3, respectively.However, in the long
run, P is lessthan MC, causingthe consumptionof water to
exceed the efficient level. The overconsumptionof water
occurs because someone else is subsidizinglocal consumption.

Thus anotherimportantmessageis that introducingthe

and variable cost be taken into account.

Case4. With Q t• > 0, dQ/dP < O, and O < a < 1,
substituting(9) into (5) yields

propertytax instrumentinto the water pricingpolicy initiates
the long-run problem of inefficient use of society's resources.

a[t + c(1 - t)][dRn/dP]

m {1 - a[t + c(1 - t)]}[dRw/dP- d(TVC)/dV].

(11)

The signof the term dR v/dP is dependentuponthe magni-

5.

Concluding Remarks
This paper demonstrates
that dependingon valuesfor

the commonpracticeof
tudeofOv. if theuniversity's
demand
forwaterisinelasticdemand,cost,andtax parameters,
(Or > -1), the fight-handterm dRv/dP is a componentof
the marginalbenefit to home owners of increasingP. It

averagetotal costpricingmightbe inferiorto price policies
whichinvolvefinancingsomeor all debt retirementand

capturesthe increasedrevenuecollectedfrom the university

possibly even some of the variable cost through property

ratherthanthroughthe propertytax. As longas the univer- taxes. In order to do what is best for some customers (home
si.tyhas an inelasticdemandfor water, dR v/dP > 0, city owners),it mightmake senseto give other customers(e.g.,
officialsview it as a nonvotingcash cow. The more inelastic a university)an easyfide, evenif the latter is viewedby the
municipality as a cash cow.
©v, the more "liquid" the cashcow.
From the perspectiveof home owners, the appropriate
In conversationwith the director of facilities management
at MTU, we were informed that "MTU would most likely
not attempt to cut back on water consumption, given the

pricepolicyrequiresthat city officials(1) be awareof the
possible
trade-offbetween
taxadvantages,
variablecost,and
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revenueobtainedfrom large,tax exemptusersof waterand

(2)obtain
reliableestimates
of relevant
parameters.
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time series,crosssectionstudy of Malm6, Sweden, Water Resour. Bull., 18, 621-625, 1982.

Hogarty, T. F., and R. J. MacKay, The impact of large temporary

Ouranalysishasfocusedon the short-runinterestof home
rate changeson residentialwater use, Water Resour.Res., 6,
owners
within a givencommunity.We havedrawnattention 791-794, 1975.
to thefact that takingadvantageof the tax code'sfavorable Howe,C. W., The impactof priceon residentialwaterdemand:
Somenewinsights,WaterResour.Res., 18, 713-716, 1982.
treatmentof property tax financingresults in a long-run
D. N., PublicFinance:A Contemporary
Applicationof
inefficient
allocationof resourcesandraisesissuesrelatedto Hyman,
Theoryand Policy, Dryden, Orlando,Fla., 1993.
the distributionof income within and acrosscommunities.
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